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Optimum Supply Control of a Monopolist in a Dynamic Market
M. Simaan and T. Takayama
Introduction
Since the time Cournot investigated the economic rationale of
firms in various markets, many economists have touched on the subject of
"monopoly" to varying extents and depths. Analytical framework of the theory
of monopoly has remained mainly static; Marshall (1920) in his Principles
of Economics , Chapter XIVj Zeuthen (1955) in Part Four of his Economic
Theory and Method ,and Malinvaud (1971) on pages 70-75 in his Lectures on
Microeconomic Theory , to mention only a few, all developed their theory
in & static framework. Obviously, "monopoly" theory has its historical
counterparts in real economic life. The most interesting examples are
the Aluminum Company of America from 1888 until World War II (see Cohen
and Cyert (1965), pp. 200-203), IBM in recent history, other big business
firms mentioned elsewhere, and other government monopolies (for instance,
the Japan Tobacco Monopoly Corporation). Except for those government
monopoly cases, the firms referred lo above seem to be under a continuous
threat from potential newcomers in both domestic and international markets.
Mv Simaan is Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of
Electrical Engineering and the Coordinated Science Laboratory, and
T. Takayama is Professor of Economics, both at the University of Illinois,
Urbana -Champaign
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Thus, for these private industries, any monopoly theory, whether static
or dynamic in isolation of competitive firms may prove ineffective in either
explaining the monopolist's behavior or providing quantitative information for
the improvement of the monopolist's performance.
Irrespective of the above observation, in this paper we plan to
develop a model of a monopolist who is completely free from the threat of
his potential or imaginary competitors, and who tries to maximize his
profit over his planning horizon [0,T) where I may be either finite or
infinite. It is interesting to note that as early as 1924, several
references have been made in the mathematical economics literature to
dynamic monopoly models such as the models developed and analyzed by
Evans (1924), and Tintner (1937). However, due mainly to the lack of well
developed dynamic optimization theory, most of these models were left
without thorough analysis. In this paper, we plan to study both qualitative
and quantitative aspects of our dynamic monopoly model by effectively
exploiting techniques developed in optimal control theory. Another aspect
that interests us is a similarity etween our dynamic monopoly model and
a dynamic economic planning model developed by Arrow (1968) in the same
spirit as ours* Thus, a micro -economic model such as a monopoly model
will find a way of dynamizing itself in the framework of optimal control
theory.
In our model, we assume that the monopolist is placed in an
environment where a dynamic demand function, instead of a static demand
function, of the form:

p(t) * f(p(t),x(t))
leads the firm to draw a rationale or optimal supply program. In the
1
above differential equation. p(t) and x(t) are the price and consumption
quantities at time t respectively. In the first section of thi3 paper, we
develop this model and formulate the profit maximization problem that the
monopolist faces in the market. In the second section, necessary conditions
for the optimal supply quantities are obtained and some important properties
of the finite and infinite horizon solutions are derived. In this develop-
ment we follow closely Simaan and Takayama (1974). In the third section of
this paper, we develop a special but easily tractable model in which the
dynamic demand function is linear and the total production cost function
is quadratic (Linear -Quadratic model) and show some of the interesting
properties of the optimal trajectories in both finite and infinite horizons.
Finally, in the fourth section we solve an example problem and in the last
section we summarize the spectrum of results.
1 . A General Dynamic Monopolist Model
In this paper, we consider a monopolist who at time t of a certain
planning horizon [0,T) produces a single commodity at the rate x(t) and
incurs a total production co3t of
(1.1) TC - g(x(t))
For early development of different types of economic dynamics
see Zeuthen (1955), Chapter 23, and Frisch referenced therein.

where g(*) is a convex function, at least twice differentiate and having
a minimum at x » 0. The commodity is then sold at a price p(t) which is
determined dynamically in the market, to be defined later, and the monopolist
secures the total revenues of
(1.2) TR « p(t)x(t)
and a total profit at time t of
(1.3) TP - p(t)x(t) -g(x(t)).
In contrast to the static monopolist model where the price p(t)
is instantaneously related to the production level x(t) through a static
demand function of the form h(p(t)) ~x(t) » 0; we shall assume in this
paper that the monopolist faces a dynamic market where the price at time
t is determined through a dynamic demand function of the form
(1.4) p(t) - ^&U f(p(t),x(t)>
, p(0) « po
where p is the initial price of the commodity at time t * 0, the. start of
the planning horison. Equation (1.4) essentially says that at each time t;
the rate of change of the price p(t) depends on the price level and consump-
tion rate (s production, rate, in our model as in Evans (1924)) at that
particular time t* Stated in different terms (1.4) relates the price at
time t, to the initial price p and to the entire history of consumption
(supply or production) function x(t) fur t in the interval of time [0,t).
Functionally this can be written as

(1.5) p(t) «0(p
o i
X(T), T€[0,t))
2
where is the trajectory of the solution of (1.4) for a given p and
o
supply function x(t). There are various assumptions that f(p,x) must
satisfy in order for (1.4) to make sense as a demand function. These are:
(i) £(p>x) aiust satisfy the usual conditions for existence and
. uniqueness of solutions of differential equations, and further-
more we assume that for each function x(t) > defined over a
certain planning horizon [0»T), where T may be infinite, (1.4)
has a solution p(t) > for all t€ [0,T)
(ii) f (p,x) must be such that for each x > there is a unique p >
such that f (p ;x) * 0, and for each p > 0, f (p,x) is concave and
there is a unique x > such that f(p,x) •
(ill) we also assume that r~< 0, r-5- <^ for all x > and p > 0,
and that f (p»x) « divides the positive p-x quadrant in two
regions: (a) the upper region where f(p,x) < and (b) the
lower region where f(p,x) > 0.
The market: "memory" in the price adjustment process (1.5) is essentially
what makes the dynamic market different from the static one. While sudden
changes in the supply will cause sudden changes in the price in a static
market (see Fig. 1(a)); they will only cause gradual, slow (or delayed)
2
Thus our actual dynamic demand function is a mapping from
R X Cr[0,t) -» R+, where. C^O.t) is the space of measurable nonnegative
functions on [Q»t) and R+ is the nonnegative part of the real line.

3
changes in the price in a dynamic market as illustrated in Fig. 1(b)
below:
*»<'>
t
x(t)
iPCO
p(t)
-
(a ) Static Marke t (b) Dynamic Market
Fig. 1. Market behavior ur !er sudden changes in supply.
Thus in a dynamic market, it "cakes time" for the price to adjust itself
when there are time variations (noc necessarily sudden as in Fig. 1) in
the consumption or supply rate. Hence, the monopolist does not enjoy an
instantaneously responsive market, and he is put in a situation where he
The problem of identifying this dynamic demand function (i.e.
P a f (P i*)) from market data is an interesting problem by itself (for
instance see Athans (1973) and Mendel (1973)) but will not be treated in
this paper. In this paper we assume that the function f (p,x) is known to
the monopolist.

has to plan his supply, knowing that variations in it could cause variations
in the price that will propagate over a certain period of time in the
future
.
The price-supply relationship of (1„4) can be studied in the p-x plane
as shown in Fig. 2. For instance, if x(t) x constant, then the price
moves in the direction stipulated by the sign of £(p,x) and eventually
reaches an equilibrium value p such that f(p,x). 0. Thus, the dynamic
demand function (or price adjustment function, the closest terminology we
can find in static stability argument of a general equilibrium (see Nikaido
(1970)) may be written in the form
(1.6) f(p(t),x(t» « G(h(x(t))-p(t))
where G(u) is a monotone increasing function of u and satisfies (see
Samuelson (1947))
(1.7) 6(0) * and ^|^1 > Vu€R.
As mentioned earlier in this paper, the monopolist is assumed to
be manipulating the supply function x(t). We shall assume that his objective
is to maximize his total profits over his planning horizon [0,7)!
4,
Lindahl, in the framework of a discrete dynamics or "period
analysis" called this type of process "disequilibrium method" in comparison
with the Marsha 11 ian "equilibrium method." However, in our continuous
dynamics, these two methods turn out to be identical if one carefully
examines the content of the following development (see Baumol (1970)
,
pp. 127-141).

8P*
f(p,x) <0
f(P,x)
(1.8)
Fig. 2. Price variations for a fixed supply.
T
ft
TT(P ,x(t» » J e"
; (p(t)x(t) -g(x(t)))dt
o
where r is a suitable discount rate. Equation (1*8) explicitly defines
the. profits as a function, of the initial price p and the supply x(t) for
all t€[0,T) which is obvious in view of the dynamics of the market (1.4)
2. The Optimal Supply Function
The problem of profit maximization (1*8) subject to the market
dynamics (1.4) can be solved by applying well known results in optimal
control theory (see Pontryagin et al. (1962)). First the Hamiltonian is

defined by
(2.1) K- p(t)x(t)-g(x(t / ) +X(t)f(p(t),x(t))
The necessary conditions for optitoality are then obtained as follows:
(2.2)
(i) p « f (p,x) , P(0) - p -
(ii) X
and
(iii) P
Sf,
(r - ~)\ - x , X (T) -
dx dx
» for x(t) >0 , or
(iii) ? p - ^^ + X ~< Q for x(t) - .dx dx
Thus for each p , the optimal supply function x*(t) can be
obtained by solving (2.2). There are several properties that follow from
these conditions, and these are summarized below.
Proposition 1 : The costate variable X (t) satisfies X(t) > and it follows
that
:
(2.3) p(t)
^
^dxlt)
21 Vt€[0,T),
and equality holds at t * T.
Proof: The proof follows easily by contradiction. Suppose X(t) < 0, then
since X(T) = there must exist a t-
€
[t,T) such that X (t, ) < and
Note that the conditions on f(p.x) and g(x) insure that H is
concave is x.
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£(t.) > 0, However, from (2.2 ii) we see that this is impossible. Thus
X (t) > 0, and (2.3) follows from (?.2 iii), and the fact that \ (T) - 0.
Irrespective of the differences between the static and dynamic
models there is, as Tintner (1937) pointed out earlier, a remarkable
resemblance between the static profit maximising condition (marginal
revenue a marginal cost) and its dynamic counterpart (2.2 iii):
(2.4) marginal cost - fi v V. & p + ^ c~~ ^ marginal revenue.
The end of horizon condition X (T) which leads to
(2 cc\ v(T\ * S?£i2LiI21
profcrays the benevolent monopolist profit maximization condition
(Takayama and Judge (1971), pp. 225-230). This is due to our assumption
in (1.8) that the terminal profit or salvage value is independent of p(T);
however if a terminal profit F(p(T)) is introduced in (1.8) then the
boundary condition of (2.2 ii) will become
(2.6) \(T) * d* fa£ffi .
P(T)
One of the interesting aspects of the. above analysis is to examine the
nature of the price-supply dynamics in the p-x plane. By simple
differentiation ana algebraic manipulations of (2.2 i, ii and iii) \(t)
can be eliminated and the following system of differential equations can
be easily obtained:
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(2.7)
p * £(p,x)
x « h(p,x)
P(0)
om « <*s(x(T))_P dx(T)
where
h(p,x) gx -ax
y
.dx ;vt ,axa P
2 2
vp dx' „ 23x
(r -^)
°x dx2
Let us assume that the equation h(p,x) generates a single -valued
function p ** H(x) such that at each pair (p,x) in the (p,x) plane,
h(p,x) is positive if p < H(x) and h(p,x) is negative if p > H(x)* We can
now draw a phase-plane diagram for (2.7) as shown in Fig. 3. For each
initial price p , (2.7) can be solved and the corresponding optimal
initial supply quantity x(0) « x can be obtained. This, therefore,
generates an optimal initial manifold from which all optimal paths are
started. On the other hand, as the terminal time T is reached, all
optimal paths must, terminate on the terminal manifold given by (2.5).
Several such optimal paths are illustrated in Fig. 3.
The fact that these assumptions indeed hold for the general
model (2.7) is very involved and lengthy to prove; however they will
be shown to hold for the special case of linear demand and quadratic cost
functions to be discussed in the following section.
An interesting question from the monopolist point of view may
be raised at this point: Is there an initial price p* that gives the
monopolist the maximum possible profit? The answer to this question is
straightforward: select p" such that X (0) - (which is obvious since
dn(p ,x<t)) d ( o
X ( ) .
.„
) # ^g condition implies (2.2 iii) that p - -2rsH
°PQ o ax J tssQ
and it essentially means that the optimal initial price, (if it exists)
must be the intersection point of the initial and terminal manifolds (Fig. 3)

Optimal trajectory for
12
h(p,x) -.0
ial Manifold
Terminal Manifold
f(P.x) =
tories
Fig. 3. Phase plane trajectories.
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We now discuss the Infinite horizon case where T -» °°. The
conditions of optlmality are the. seme as (2.2) except that the boundary
condition for (2.2 ii) mast be changed (see Arrow (1968)) to
(2.8) lim e~
rt \<t)p(t) * 0.
t-»»
*
Thus for each initial price p , the optimal system (2.2) with (2.8) as
boundary condition for \(t) t can be solved for the optimal path
(p*(t)»x*(t)} s which will satisfy (2.8) if an equilibrium point (p ,x ) is
eventually reached as t — «* . Thus this equilibrium point must be the
intersection of f(p,x) (i.e. p * 0) and h(p,x) ~ (i.e. x « 0) as
shown in Fig. 3, Obviously, there is only one optimal trajectory passing
through {p ,x } and this trajectory (curve CL CL In Fig. 3) is also the
optimal initial manifold for this infinite horizon problem. Hence for
each initial price p , the monopolist must adjust his initial supply to
be on the curve C,C
5 ,
and as the price moves upwards or downwards, he must
keep on adjusting his supply so that at each t, the point {p(t),x(t)} stays
always on C.C, until fp ,x ) is reached. This trajectory will guarantee
the monopolist maximum profit. Finally, it may be worthwhile to mention
at this point, the resemblance between this dynamic monopolist profit
maximizing behavior and the dynamic economic planning model discussed in
Arrow (1968). We will sharpen these results in the next section and fully
investigate various aspects of the initial and terminal manifolds and
optimal trajectories of our linear-quadratic monopoly model .
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3. The Linear Demand and Quadratic Cost Monopolist Model
An interesting special case of the previous analysis which leads
to an analytically tractable solution is when the demand function (1.4) is
linear and the production cost function (1.1) is quadratic. That is when
8
(3.1) p * c - ap - bx , p(0) p„
and
(3.2) g(x) J QfX .
The parameters c, a, b and a are assumed to be known and positive. The
profits over the time horizon [0,T) are then;
(3.3) n(p ,x(t)) - J e"
rc[p(t)x(t)
-f ax
Z (t)]dt1 2
2
a
and the necessary conditions (2.2) can be easily written as:
(3.4)
(d) • p * c - ap - bx P
(ii) i * (r+a)X -x X
< (ill) p - ax - b\ * for
any p - ax - bX < for
Uiii)" p * ax - bX > for
p(0) - p
c
(T) -
0<xir
c
b
Q
Note that the function f(p,x) * c - ap - bx satisfied the conditions
in Section 1 only in a compact rectangle in the p-x plane defined by
c c0<^p£— and 0<^x<r • In the necessary conditions of optimality (2.2) account
must then be taken of the constraint x(t) ^ r in addition to x(t) > 0. The
constraint that 0^p(t)^ ~ will then be automatically satisfied in view of
the solution of (3.1):
> )e~
at
- be~
at j eaTx(T)dr,ea va
and for 0^x(t)^ r>and need not be accounted for in the necessary conditions
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By exploiting the results obtained for our general dynamic monopoly model,
let us study the dynamic properties of the phase-plane diagram based on
(2.7), which now can be written as:
(3.5) i
p f (p,x) « c - ap - bx p(0) « p
x h(p,x) * 9-.L±M. p + (r+a )x , X (T) • i p(T)
by eliminating \(t) from (3.4) (i), (ii) and (iii). The phase plane is now
clearly divided into four regions by the two lines f(p,x) and h(p,x)
and the general discussions made on Fig. 3 apply exactly to this case. The
phase-plane and trajectories are shown in Fig. 4. Let us first discuss the
finite horizon problem.
*
3. a. The Finite Horizon Case
The terminal manifold in this case is given by the line x(T) *
— p(T). In order to determine which trajectory is optimal for a given
initial p , it is necessary to 3olve the two point boundary value system
given by (3.5) (or (3.4)). However since our system is of the linear
quadratic type, a transformation of the Riccati type, well known in optimal
control theory (see Athans and Falb (1966)), can reduce it to a single
point boundary value problem. We shall express this transformation as
follows
(3.6) x(t) - K(t)p(t) + E(t)
where K(t) and E(t) are functions of time to be computed. This transformation

16
Pi
c
a
Optimal In:.tial Manifold
Fig. 4. Phase plane for the Linear Quadratic Problem.
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has a physical significance; it expresses the supply at time t as a
function of the price of time t. T is will then be tfca optimal supply
curve that will determine the monopolist's output based on the current
price prevailing in the market, that is a "feedback" supply function.
Upon differentiating (3.6) with respect to time and making use of (3.5),
the following differential equations for K(t) and E(t) are obtained:
{(i) K * K(r+2a) •*- bK2 - Z±l* > K(T) « I
o> or
(ii) E « (r+a+bK)E + c(~ ~ K) , E(T) - 0.
Thus by solving (3.7) backward in time from t T to t » 0, we get K(t)
and E(t) Vt€[0,T). Equation (3.7)(i) is a first order quadratic
equation of the Riccati-type which has a solution (obtained by simple
integrat ion) t
/a r+2awh . r+2a , . . ^ , r-K2a N ,b , r-t-2a aN -23(T~t)
where
p;«
/(r+2a)2 ~ lr+2aik
4 a
Equation (3.7) (ii) is linear time-varying, and has a solution of the form;
t
T J (r-hi-fbKk))d>
(3,9) E(t)«.fc(--K(T))e T dT.
t *

18
By simple algebraic manipulations, it is easy to obtain the following
bound8 on K(t) and E(t)
(i) < K(t) <L £
(ii) E(t) < .
Equations (3.10) (i) and (3.6) reveal an interesting property of the optimal
marginal supply function; namely:
(3.11) o< ~r^= K(t)< idp(t; — of
whenever (3.4) (iii) holds. From the above analysis, the optimal initial
manifold is therefore a line of the form
(3.12) x(0) - K(0)p
o
+E(0),
and every optimal trajectory must start on this manifold, satisfy (3.6) at
each t and move along the solution of:
(3.13) p(t) » (c -bE(t)) - (a+bK(t»p(t) ,p(0) - PQ
and finally terminate on the line
(3.14) x(T) - ~ p(T).
a
It is important at this stage to mention the following three interesting
observations
:
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(a) K(0) and E(0) in (3.12) are both functions of T; and a simple
analysis of (3.8) reveals that the larger is T, the smaller is its
corresponding K(0); i.e. if ^ > T () then ^(0) < 1^(0).
(b) As indicated in (3.4)(iii) c and (iii)", the initial manifold (3.12)
holds for all initial prices p such that the condition < x(0) < rO — — D
is satisfied. In other words such that:
(3 ' 15) R(0)^ po^ K(0) *
If however (3.15) is not satisfied for a certain p , then according to
(3.4) (iii)' and (iii)" the supply function must be kept at either x(t)=0
or x(t) * r- according to the following rule:
(i) x(t) * if p(t) < - §&*
.16) J KkZ)
I
at) «(t>-& if p(t)> c/v(t)
(t )
(3
which will cause the price to rise for case (1) and to fall for case
(ii) until a time t^ is reached where the price p(t-) is on the
manifold (3.12), and then the pcimal trajectory will continue
according to (3.12) until the terminal manifold is reached. This
situation is clearly illustrated in Fig. 4.
(c) It is Interesting to point out that a fixed end-point version of this
finite horizon linear quadratic problem was treated by Evans as early
as 1924 using calculus of variations techniques. Even though his
treatment focused mainly on obtaining the optimal price trajectory
by solving a second oider differential equation, it may be worthwhile
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to point out how the present treatment can be adapted to generate
Evans optimal trajectory . If we assume that the price at time T is
fixed at p(T) p., and if r-0 (as in Evans (1924)) then an optimal
trajectory inside <L x < c and <^ p <^ — must satisfy the necessary
conditions (3.4):
(i) p « c ~ap-bx p(0) - pQ , p(T) » px
(3.17) I
I
(ii) i » aX -x X(T) is free
(iii) p -ax - bX * .
By differentiating (3.17) (i) and eliminating X(t) and x(t), we can
easily obtain Evans' equation for the optimal price trajectory:
(3.18) p(t) -a(a + —)p + (a + ~)c * 0.
Of 0/
The solution of this equation exhibits two exponential modes and is
of the form
(3.19) p(t) - p+ C
x
mt
+ C
2
e"
mt
where y~----_^
m <* J a (a +•-*) and p * -r- (a + —);
cx «,* a
and C. and C* are constants that: can be obtained from the conditions
P(0) as P and p(T) « pv
These results are nicely reflected on the phase plane diagram of
Fig. 4, where an optimal trajectory is now connecting two horizontal lines
at p and p . The shape of this optimal trajectory is easily revealed from
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the location of the lines p and p, on the diagram. We will now discuss
o 1
the infinite horizon problem.
3.b. The Infinite Horizon Case
As T -* «», it can be easily shown that the functions K(t) and E(t)
in (3*6) will converge to some constant values (K and E in (3.7) will tend
to zero) say K and E. Following our discussion in Section 2, the corres-
ponding trajectory will be optimal if an equilibrium level (p ,x ) is
eventually reached. Thus upon solving the algebraic equations (3.7) after
setting R B E 0, the following solutions are obtained:
(3.20)
r
1
+ rr-VOH-aar + — (r+2a)
4b
or
~,/(r+2a)2 + — (r+2a)
t +a+b!l
We now identify the pair (K. >£, ) as corresponding to the optimal path since
A. A
the corresponding "feedback" supply law:
(3.21) .*/x"(t) - KjP<t) + £
t
leads to a price trajectory satisfying
(3.22) p - (c -blj) ~ (a+bK^p
, p(0) = P(
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and which (since a + bK- > 0) as t - *> reaches asymptotically the equilibrium
price level
c - b£,
- a-rbK,
J
or
r —a *—
(3.23) p_
1 r+a+- (2+£)
« a'
The corresponding equilibrium supply level, easily computed from (3.21) if
k (1+ £)
(3.24) x
r+a+- (2+-)
a a
At this stage, we note that this eauilibrium point (p ,x ) is also the
e e
intersection point of the two linear functions f(?,x) and h(p,x) =
given in (3=5).
On the other hand, the pair (IC,S
5 )
corresponds to the supply
function
(3.25) x(t) - EjP2'(t) +E2
which (since a+biv, < 0) '^-.a.ds to an unstable price trajectory satisfying:
(3o26) p « (c -b£
2
) - (a+b£
, p(0) - pQ .
The phase-plane representation corresponding to this infinite horizon
problem is shown in Fig. 5. The optiiiiai supply curve is clearly composed
of three pares
:

23
instable trajectory
*ftj.\ VfcjTt-
e b
X
Fig. 5c Optimal supply carve for infinite horizon linear
quadratic case.,
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E
1
(i) x(t) - if £ p(t) < - ~~
_ _
E, c/b - S,
27 ^
(it) x(t) - K.
(
p(t) + K, if - zr <;.. P(t) *.—=—
c/b
-E-
(iii) x(t) « £ if -——A,. p(t > < S. .
The optimal trajectory is shown by the segments O.A.E and CLA^E . Points
As and. A« are the "entry" points at which the monopolist should switch from
zero or maximum supply to his linear supply rule (3.21). They have an
interesting economic interpretation: Suppose, the initial price p is on
the segment CLA^ , then according to the previous analysis, a profit
maximizing monopolist would keep his supply at the zero level and wait
for the price to rise until a certain level (point A,) is reached when, it
becomes beneficial to place his output in the market and control, it
according to his linear supply curve. Similarly if the initial price p
is larger than point A«, then a profit maximizing monopolist would inject
his maximum supply in the market a"4 will switch to his linear supply
curve when the price has fallen to the level of point A~. As t -» », in
both cases , the optimal, price and supply will reach the equilibrium level
(p »x ) and remain there as long as there are no external disturbances to
e e
the market. It is inter as ting to observe that the poiiitt (p ,x ) is a
function only of the parameters a, b, c, r and or of the model; and that

ap 2
(3.28) -r* - - J V „ , <
u
or a''
J
and
dp ~f~" <Ha >
2
c a a
25
(3.29)
* " —
S4-s
-T "
—
?>°« '
aof tt r*+a+-<2+~)]L
cs? a -
The above expressions essentially confirm reasonable comparative dynamics
conclusions that:
i) The equilibrium price is lower for a higher discount rate, and
ii) The equilibrium price will be higher if the cost of production is
higher.
^^«^-ii^i^£L^LJ^ii§£'£ls.
In this section, we illustrate the linear-quadratic infinite
horiaon solution by the following simple numerical example. Let
p * 4 . 2p - x
,
p(0) * p
and
«<
*y o lL/» * <. . i .L «u
rr(p ,x(t» * J e"
Uoi
Tp(t)x(t) -± x"(t)]dt.
The parameter values for this problem are: a 2, b 1, c « 4, a » r-
r * 0.1, From (3.20) we have K. * 2.50 and ^ " -0.13; and the optimal
supply function (3.27) is
and
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r
(i) x(t) * if < p(t) < 0.05
(ii) x(t) » 2.5 p(t) -0.13 if 0.05 < p(t) < 1.65
(iii) x(t) - 4 if 1.65 < p(t) < 2 .
Finally the equilibrium level is given by
:
p « 1.78
e
x ** 1.63 .
e
In this paper, an attempt has been made to formulate the profit
maximizing monopoly problem within the framework of optimal control theory.
It waa assumed that the price-consumption (* supply) relationship in the
market is governed by a dynamic demand function and that the objective of
the monopolist is to maximise his total discounted profit over a certain
time horizon that may be either finite or infinite. This model, in
contrast with the static model, accounts for the dependence of the
ccEEiodity price at future times on the current supply rate. Several
interesting results that are not apparent from the static model have been
obtained from this dynamic formulation. First, for the finite horizon
problem, the existence o£ two manifolds in the p**x plane has been
established: the initial optimal manifold, which is the starting point
of every optimal trajectory and the terminal manifold on which every optimal
trajectory must terminate. Furthermore, it was shown that the point of
intersection ox these two manifolds (if it exists) gives the best initial
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starting price p* for the monopolist in order to obtain his highest
maximum profit. Second, for the infinite horizon problem, a behavior
similar to Arrow's economic planning model (1968) has been pointed out and
it was shown that all optimal paths must follow one optimal stable
trajectory, in the p-x plane, which eventually converges to an equilibrium
point (p ,x ).
e e
The special, but highly operational case of linear demand and
quadratic cost functions has then been treated in detail and the monopolist's
optimal supply curve was shown explicitly to be composed of three sections
depending on the current market price of the commodity. These sections are
described as follows: (a) if the price is below a certain level the
monopolist should cut his supply to zero; (b) if the price is above a
certain level, then the monopolist should place his maximum supply capacity
in the market and (c) if the price is between these two levels, he should
use a linear supply curve. The optimal price -supply trajectories have been
illustrated on the p-x plane for both the finite horizon case where a
linear terminal manifold is reached and the infinite horizon case where an
equilibrium point is eventually attained. In addition, some conclusions
have been obtained with regards to the effect of the discount rate and
the coefficient of the quadratic cost function on the equilibrium price
level: a higher discount rate will lead to a lower equilibrium price
level and a higher production cost will lead to a higher equilibrium price
level
.
We feel that in this paper we have explored various features of
dynamic monopoly markets in the light of modern optimal control theory.
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Developments in this direction naturally lead us towards dynamic duopoly,
oligopoly, and perfect competition markets. A dynamic duopoly game has
been formulated and solved for its dynamic Cournot solutions (see Simaan
and Takayama (1974)) in the framework of differential game theory; however,
due to their complex structures dynamic oligopoly and perfect competition
models remain as challenging problems for future research in this area.
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